


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# THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE

BY THE RIGHT HON.  
GEORGE WYNDHAM M.P.

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*“Moribus antiquis stat res Romana virisque.”*—ENNIVS.

*“Hæc est in gremium victos quæ sola recepit . . .  
Matris non dominæ Vritu, civesque vocavit  
Quos domuit, nexuque pio longinqua revinxit.  
Hujus pacificis debemus moribus omnes  
Quod veluti patriis regionibus utitur hospes ;  
Quod sedem mutare licet. . . .”*—CLAUDIAN.

*“ . . . major rerum mihi nascitur ordo ;  
Majus opus moveo.”*—VIRGIL.

# THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE

Being an Address delivered to the  
Students of the University of  
Glasgow, November 1904

BY THE RIGHT HON.  
GEORGE WYNDHAM M.P.

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TO MR  
ALFRED



# THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE

GENTLEMEN,

A man whose life is mortgaged to Party politics addressing men whose lives are devoted to learning must avoid political controversy and may well shrink from intrusion within the precincts of Literature, Philosophy, Æsthetics and Science. I hail these high themes with instinctive reverence, but with rational modesty I say to them "Fare ye well!" I am a public servant in the conduct of affairs. You are, or mean to be, Masters of the Arts. Neither region is familiar to us both; yet the Lord Rector and the members of one University are one family, and he, chosen by them, should elect some

common ground for his Address. I dismiss the popular subterfuge of Education and, since you are philosophers and I am a politician, propose to you a discourse on one branch of the Philosophy of Politics, rather, I might say, on the parent stem stripped of ramification and foliage. My subject is remote, and distinct, from transitory contentions usually suggested by the word "Politics." These controversies are, of course, important in their way and for our time. I do not undervalue their moment. Yet, by comparison with Politics in the simpler sense of that word, they seem, even to me, a politician, but little more than a stage play of which the interest centres not so much on the plot and the characters as on their exits and their entrances. That is the end of my exordium. Without further ado I name my subject "The Development of the State."

The Development of the State affords us common ground. It is a theme at once practical and philosophic, but neither transcendental nor of To-day. So, turning my back on the Halls of Westminster and the plantations of Academus, I seek the alleys of the Lyceum and find a convenient point of departure for my peripatetics in the saying of Aristotle:—"Man is by nature a political animal"; a living being that can prosper only in an organized society.

His saying is trite, but still pregnant. Two questions leap from it clamouring for definition: "What sort of man?" "What sort of State?" An unguarded answer to the first question might land me into Metaphysics or Biology. Fortunately Aristotle's sentence—and that is my text—excludes isolated men. It deals with man only in relation to the State and declares that the nature of his being consists in that relation. The context goes on to say that any

man outside that relation must be either a God or a beast. Isolated men, whether God-like or beastly, are akin to the hermit-crab. They occupy, without ceremony or concern, shells, accidentally convenient to them, but congenitally evolved by others. The sage and the felon are, politically, cuckoos. I would also exclude abstract Man, that nebulous impersonality of metaphysical anthropologists.

I dismiss Rousseau's abstract Man, the imaginary creation of eighteenth century dogmatism, with his equally imaginary Rights. The State demands real men who owe to it real duties. I dismiss the composite conception based, partly on the *Germania* of Tacitus, and partly on recent studies of aboriginal tribes. After these must follow the latest abstract Man, Darwin's Man, "probably arboreal in his origin." A brilliant speculation put forward from this chair by one of its most

illustrious occupants has, indeed, invested metaphysico-biological Man with vivid interest. I refer to Mr. Balfour's striking theory that, to adopt his phrase, the process of "physiological accumulation" by which Man acquired his existing mental and bodily equipment was in all probability completed by the stress of conflict during a savage prime. I refer to that theory solely to make it even more plain that I am dealing, not with the Evolution of Man, but with the Development of the State, in which men 'live and move and have their being.' Men who by nature are functional parts of a political organism must be the men we know; historic and humanistic men, recorded in annals or revealed by literature and legend.

Having excluded isolated men and abstract Man, I come to the second question, "What sort of State?" What is, what ought to be,

what might be that type of Polity to which men should owe duties during their lives and for which they must, if need be, lay down their lives? The saying of Aristotle excludes the cosmopolitan ideal, and, again, I welcome the exclusion. To do Rousseau justice, even he bids us distrust those cosmopolitans who set out to seek at a distance in their books duties which they disdain to fulfil about them. Do I err in dismissing curtly from a philosophic discourse an ideal, acclaimed by Tennyson :—

“The Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World,”—

and ascribed by Plutarch to Socrates? These are great names to conjure with. But the formation of a judgment on the value of an ideal may often be assisted if we will note the date and the authorship of the phrase struck to convey that ideal. The phrase—“A Citizen of the World”—is not found in literature until

centuries after Aristotle. It is coined by Philo Judæus or by Plutarch in the first century of our era, and it is reminted, say a hundred years later, by Diogenes Laertius, and Lucian. We owe it to three Greeks and a Jew who, being aliens by origin, wrote within the Roman Empire long after the polities constructed by their own nations had been overthrown. Considering the date and circumstances of this word's appearance in literature I am not restrained from saying that a cosmopolitan world is not a polity, and cannot inspire the love or exact the allegiance of men who, by nature, must be members of an organic State. Philo, the Jew, was intent on reconciling the Mosaic books with Greek philosophy. Plutarch, as I said, ascribes the phrase to Socrates, but—and mark the significance—in an essay on Banishment. Plutarch was essentially a Greek lecturer, who sought his audience in Flavian Rome. Diogenes Laertius, writing



the lives of Greek philosophers, fathers the phrase on Diogenes, the cynic, who, if he used it, did so apparently on the ground that he cared nothing for the country in which he lived, nor indeed for anything else. Lucian, deriding these same philosophers in his *Auction of Lives*, gives it a like attribution. He, a Greek, who scoffed at the inestimable gift of his own race to mankind, accepted a small administrative post in Egypt from the Roman Emperor Commodus.

These three Greeks and one Jew were great men of letters; but men who, having despaired of their nationalities, acquiesced in the Roman Empire without caring for its fortunes; and that Empire, because of its tendency to a cosmopolitanism, which they applauded, fell, two centuries later, the emasculated prey of virile races, still in the earliest stage of political development.

Nor am I shaken when the phrase recurs



in Montaigne's essays. He stood aloof from the civil and religious distractions of his own country, France. It turns up once more in Thomas Pain's *Rights of Man*, and repeatedly in the prospectus and motto of Garrison's *Public Liberator*. But it leaves me unmoved. The political surroundings and philosophic pre-occupations of all who employed the phrase and belauded the cosmopolitan ideal confirm my belief that aspiration towards that ideal saps the vigour of citizenship and arrests the Development of the State. The race, the nation, even the Empire, in so far as we have been able to frame a true political conception of that yet more comprehensive organism, may each and all be considered embryonic: fore-runners, and, in some degree, fore-tellers, of an ideal polity that may come into being and should be brought to birth. But cosmopolitanism is not embryonic: it is abortive. It serves only to sacrifice this

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or that political beginning by anticipating the image of an universal political end. To study the Development of the State in terms of isolated men would be futile. They may stand, in the philosophy of Politics, for the assumed primordial star-dust in the science of Astronomy. They are the stuff out of which the primitive State evolved its first stage of development. But to study the State's further development in terms of cosmopolitanism would be absurd. As well might Astronomers, forsaking research, resign themselves to a placid contemplation of that predicted period in which, the dead moon having retraced her spiral to a frozen earth, and the planets having returned to an extinguished sun, the whole solar system shall drift inert through the night of space towards the dark resultant of a like catastrophe. That plausible, if not exhilarating, sidereal hypothesis spells death to

our planet and to the life which it supports. Cosmopolitanism spells death to the State and to the virtues of citizenship.

What, then, is the middle term between primordial individualism and abortive cosmopolitanism? What should be that type of State to which each citizen can pay a living allegiance without umbrage to the renown of his dead ancestors, or offence to the pride taken, as legitimately, by fellow-citizens in racial origins alien from his own? The State must be large enough in contour to fire the imagination of all its citizens with faith in the future; yet to each citizen it must be so near in detail as to evoke piety towards the memorial past. The ideal State, the State that is to be, must have one grandeur of political design illuminated by diverse glories of race achievement.

## II

AN attempt to frame a conception of the ideal State or, as I would rather put it, to foresee the next stage in the State's organic evolution, is beset by two difficulties. In the first place, those who have written philosophically on the ideal State have had consciously in their minds, or subconsciously, at the back of their heads as we say, the concrete facts of the particular polity in which they lived and of others around it. And our own minds are in like manner preoccupied. Even from the philosophy of Politics there is no complete escape into pure abstraction. I cannot speak, nor can you listen to, this Address without some thought of Scotland's past and the Empire's future.

For example, Aristotle's ideal State is, as it happens, the Greek Πόλις : broadly, a machine for making the highest life possible to a few thousand persons, the citizens, but not to their slaves, nor even to their wives. And we feel that he writes under the shadow of a nascent Macedonian Empire. Through Dante's verse there throbs an echo of the conflict between the two great constructive ideals of the Middle Age, neither of which was realized. Amid much else of eternal beauty we find him backing a Ghibelline Empire against a Guelph Papacy. De Boulainvilliers openly deplores the abolition of feudalism. Hobbes is vividly aware of the recent decapitation of his King. Their speculations are engrossed by concrete facts of the fleeting Present.

The second difficulty is inherent in the terms which they employed, and which we must employ, for lack of better. Any attempt

at divining an ideal type of the State to be evolved in the Future can never be more, or other, than a visionary presentment of the more hopeful features exhibited by the actual State in the Present. And in making that attempt we are restricted to existing terms. But faint reflections of the vanished Past loom in these terms. Our thoughts are clogged by what is : the words through which we seek to convey our thoughts are blurred by what has been. We are deafened by the domination of the Present ; we are also baffled by jangling discords from the Past.

We must—to take at random a handful of political phrases—speak of Citizenship, of Patriotism, of the rights of Nations, the destiny of the Race, the ideal of Empire.

These terms are not the exact terms of science, constructed—to the despair of philologists—out of one, or even two dead languages,

and so constructed for the precise purpose of defining a new idea sharply from old ideas which have prevailed and are to be discarded.

The terms in which we must discuss the Development of the State are words, not labels ; and, in common with all words, have a story imbedded in them. Their etymology bears the impress of earlier phases in the evolution of the State. Bearing that impress they become, as the evolution proceeds, inadequate or inconvenient for a description of the next phase that is coming into being.

If I say : "The Highlanders died for their country at Magèrsfontein," I speak a great truth. But the words do not fit the full intension and extension of that supreme sacrifice to public duty paid, as it was, more than six thousand miles from their native land by men fighting side by side with fellow-citizens drawn from every quarter of the globe. The word



“country” does not fit the fact like a glove. It cramps it like a glove with too few fingers.

The relative inadequacy of words which have grown, by comparison with scientific terms, which have been expressly constructed, has, I believe, a compensating advantage. Their etymology betrays what they once meant. And to contrast that which they now mean with that which they once meant may be helpful. The words in which we speak of the State may reveal the evolution of the State in the past, as fossils assist in reproducing pictures of earlier geological epochs. I propose, then, to take the common words which we use, without premeditation, when discussing the broader aspects of Politics, and to subject them to two tests. First, pursuing an etymological method, I shall seek to discover what they once meant ; and, secondly, pursuing a literary method, I shall seek to discover when, and, if possible, why, they assumed



a modern meaning which differs from their original meaning.

Throughout this enquiry I shall reserve the word "State" for general application to any form of polity. It is convenient for that purpose because it is less impregnated with etymological colour, and, consequently, less surcharged with pristine connotations than are the other words usually employed. Of these, two, the Greek *Πόλις* and the Latin *populus*, from which many modern terms are derived, suggest etymologically no more than the idea of multitude. Originally they must have come into being when the mere fact of a number of people living together was in itself remarkable.

The remainder fall into two groups. They are, in respect of their etymological roots, either place-words, or race-words. The roots from which they spring and flourish mean, for the

first group, a comparatively small area of fixed abode; for the second, the comparatively few persons undoubtedly descended from a common ancestor: that and no more.

Taking first the group of etymological place-words, our word "citizen" comes from the Latin *civis*, whose import ultimately expanded to proud proportions in the Imperial claim, "*civis Romanus sum.*" But *civis* springs from a root which means no more than to abide. Etymologically it recalls a primeval distinction between the man attached to the, presumably, conquered soil, and the nomad of no fixed abode. Our word *country* means now much more than the French word *contrée*, from which it was taken, and that word traces back through Romance languages to the Low Latin *contrata*, based on *contra*, opposite. Its original meant, long ago, that which is opposite, the prospect, and so, at first, a limited space of permanent

residence. It offers an exact analogy to *gend*, the German for country, from *gegen*, opposite. The French word *pays* was politically important in mediaeval and feudal literature. Etymologically it refers back to a place with boundaries and, probably, to no more than the reservation for a tribe. *Land*, in such compound words as Scotland or England, is now an important political term. We speak of fighting for our native land and think of these. Yet it seems almost certain that the English word *land* originally meant that which the French word *lande* still means, namely, an open space bearing a sparse spontaneous growth. The Engles, who, instead of any other among her many invaders, gave England her name, came from just such narrow and impoverished districts. The word *land* suggests that the first fixed habitations must have been on natural open spaces occurring only where the soil was too poor to support

primeval forests. And that meaning seems to persist in the lines of Shakespeare :—

“Under this thick-grown brake we'll hide ourselves  
For through this laund anon the deer will come.”

When subjected to etymological analysis the political terms *citizen*, *land* (as in Scotland or England), *pays*, *country*, reveal, in the earliest type of the State, a dominating idea of fixed abode. At that primitive stage in the State's development they connoted no more than the stockaded hill ; the natural glade, or heath, or down ; the reservation for a tribe not wholly assimilated in a polity occupying a comparatively larger area ; or the home district of a clan. The dominating idea of attachment to a fixed abode persists through later and successive expansions in the applicability of these words, and of their derivatives, to wider and wider areas. But since these words, and words derived from, or akin to, them, do become continuously applicable to

wider and wider areas until, in some cases, they at length denote the vast habitats of modern nations, there is revealed a continuous trend towards complex political aggregation.

Let me now examine the group of etymological Race-words. "Race" itself, derived from or akin to the High German *Reiza*, once meant no more than common lineage; scarcely more than a family whose blood-relationship, however large the family might have become, was not a political fiction but a fact attested of living memory. I touch on the Latin "*Gens*" only to say that it meant the same thing, originally, as the Teutonic *Race*, and to insist, for a moment, on its interesting relation to another Latin word, *Natio*. *Natio*, from which we get to-day so many loud words that figure so largely in modern politics—nation, nationality, nationalism—bore in Latin a more restricted meaning than even *Gens*, which has no modern political

significance. *Gens* originally connoted clan sentiment and patrician pride. *Natio* in classical Latin meant much less, and was applied, by Cicero for example, almost as a term of contempt to distant and barbarous peoples with whom the *Romanae Gentes*, unforeseeing the future, supposed that they had, and would have, but little concern.

Lastly, I cite the French word "*patrie*," from the Latin *patria* and *pater*. It, also, connoted originally no more than the idea of descent from one man, and yet, to-day, *patriotism* is the word we must perforce employ to describe that noble sentiment which impelled Highlander and Lowlander, the descendants whether of Gael, or Briton, Jute, Engle, Saxon, Osterling, Dane, Norman, Angevin, Huguenot, Flamand, or Palatine, to fight beneath the Southern Cross, side by side with Canadians—of English, Scotch, and French extraction—and Australians and

South Africans, for a political ideal which can hardly be stated in existing political terminology.

The dominating idea suggested etymologically by the group of race-words is of common lineage. But they, too, reveal a continuous trend towards complex political aggregation in the course of which consanguinity became more and more a political fiction, not, as I shall show, unattended with danger to the Development of the State.

Having subjected these words to etymological analysis, I now apply my second, literary, test. From their original meanings I take a jump, over centuries, to the time when they assumed the meanings which they now bear. It will assist our consideration of the Development of the State to discover when the word *country* became applicable to, say, France or Scotland; when the word *nation*, in despite of its contemptuous use in Latin, became applicable to the



Scots and the French; and when the word *patriotism* became applicable to the love of such nations for their countries. If we can discover when they assumed their present political meanings, we may be able to guess why they assumed them. It is possible, if not to prove, at least to establish a presumption, that the meaning of these three words—*country*, *nation*, *patriotism*—did not expand to their present significance before the sixteenth century.

The English word *country* is taken from the French word *contrée*. *Contrée* has never meant in French, and does not even now mean, a political country such as France. It still means a country-side or comparatively small physiological area. Throughout the Middle Age *contrée* meant a smaller area than *pays*, and *pays* itself had not become applicable to France. *Pays* described the provincial native land from which a feudal lord led to war his



Bretons, or Burgundians, or Angevins. It meant no more than a district to which men were attached by feudal, or clan sentiment. The narrower sense remains in such phrases as, for example, the familiar *Vin du pays*, just as the English word *country*, concurrently with the wider significance to which its meaning has expanded, still retains an earlier and narrower sense in such phrases as the North country or the West country. But the French word *pays* was almost supplanted by the word "*patrie*" at a time when it was still restricted to the narrower provincial meaning.

Now—and here I can clinch the argument—we know, through the accident of an erudite conflict, exactly when the word *patrie* appears in French literature to the prejudice, as it turned out, of further expansion in the political meaning of *pays*. The word *patrie* is used by the French poet and man of letters, Joachim

du Bellay, in the earliest years of the second half of the sixteenth century—just after 1550. He was deliberately intent on purifying and enriching his native tongue, and to that end published a famous pamphlet called *The Defence and Illustration of the French Language*. But a contemporary man of letters, Charles Fontaine, trounces du Bellay soundly, after the manner of contemporary men of letters, for introducing, in *patrie*, an unnecessary neologism. “The Man,” he writes, “who can use the word *pays* has no use for the word *patrie*.” De Baif, one of du Bellay’s colleagues in the literary movement of the poets who called themselves “La Pleïade,” returns to the charge, declaring that “*patrie*” is a beautiful word. The battle rages, and accidentally gives a date to the acclimatisation of the word “*patrie*” in France. My point is that later than 1550 both du Bellay, who substituted

*patrie* for *pays*, and Fontaine, who took him to task for the substitution, meant, and meant only, by either word *the province in which a man was born*. There is no hint of either word being usually applicable to the whole of France, or of either word being tinged with the modern idea of nationality. Afterwards, no doubt, *patrie* became in French the right word for France, as *country* became in English the right word for England or Scotland, but it was after and not before the year 1550.

And so, too, with the French word "*nation*." Throughout the Middle Age, and notably in the fifteenth century, Froissart and Mathieu de Couci use the word "*nation*"—*nation*—in the sense which, I suppose, it originally bore in our University of Glasgow, where recently three out of four nations conferred the high honour which elicits this humble address. Froissart writes of

“all kinds of people who were not of the nation of London,” that is, who were not born in London. De Couci, in his *History of Charles VIII*, tells us that “the town of Bruges had, for so long that the memory of man went not to the contrary, been frequented by merchants who were strangers.” He adds that these merchants were called “the Nations.”

I conclude that the three words which I selected—*country*, *nation*, *patriotism*—only began to assume their modern political and national import in the sixteenth century. That is when they assumed it. Can we guess why they did so? The answer is, I believe, simply that the political entities and the political sentiment, now designated by those words, were at the beginning of that century of too recent a creation to have changed the meaning of everyday speech. The meaning of language alters, of course, after, and not before, changes

have been effected in the things which it describes.

This consideration, first of the etymological origin of the words in which we must discuss the Development of the State, and, secondly, of the date at which they assumed their modern meanings, may serve to bring out into higher relief certain features in that Development with which we are all, no doubt, familiar, but which we sometimes overlook. These words reveal two dominating ideas, of attachment to a fixed abode, and of real or fancied consanguinity, in every type of the State constructed in the past by the political animal in obedience to the dictates of his nature. Further, they reveal a continuous trend towards a complex political aggregation swayed, it may be, during this, or that, period more by one than by the other of those ideas: but always embracing both.

### III

I DO not, of course, suggest that the Development of the State has proceeded without breach of continuity. History refutes that by the collapse of the Roman Empire and, again, by the failure to construct Christendom, as a polity, out of feudalism. The fall of the Roman Empire before inroads of races in the fifth century ; the fabrication of modern powers from the ruins of feudalism in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries mark the close of two out of the three epochs into which Western history can for convenience be divided. And, now, after four centuries of the third epoch, the Nation-States, or European Powers, fabricated at its com-

mencement, find themselves face to face with, as it seems, the coming into being of a new, a larger, and an even more complex, type of the State. Can that be brought to birth? Can a third breach of continuity in development be evaded by polities which include in their populations many races and hold sway over territories separated by oceans? If we are on the eve of a further stage in the Development of the State which may, in after-times, be held to mark a fourth epoch in history, it is proper to consider the features, or forces, which have appeared in every preceding type of the State.

The future is a darkness impenetrable to man. We must search our way into it step by step. If we are not to stumble, each step must be illumined. But there is no light save from the past, and, from the past, we must fetch light, if only in lanterns.

We find in every preceding type of the

State two dominating ideas ; first, the sentiment of consanguinity or pride in Race, and, secondly, attachment to a fixed abode evinced, almost always, by a population of diverse race extraction. These two ideas are not easily harmonized. We find, also, a continuous trend towards complex political aggregation, so constant as almost to argue a force of human nature which might be called Political Gravitation. But to that force one, or other, more often both, of the dominant ideas are in some measure refractory. Can we assist in directing a continuous development by avoiding known aberrations which have, so history teaches, occasioned breaches in continuity? Success in such an enterprise must, I submit, depend, in the first place, on a frank recognition of these three features, or forces. We must count on their persistence. In the light of that recognition we may seek a wholesome, instead



of an unwholesome, interaction between the two dominant ideas, of pride in Race and of attachment to a particular territory. And we may, again, seek so to control the force of Political Gravitation as to evolve a type of the State in which, however complex, by analogy with the solar system, planetary politics, however huge, might be swayed from a primal tendency to direct collision into a choric pursuit of inter-dependent orbits.

## IV

WHAT are the errors of the past which we should do well to shun? Taking the first epoch of Western history from the advent of Aryan tribes in the lands that contain and jut into the Mediterranean Sea we note chiefly the persistent, if occasionally interrupted, effect of Political Gravitation culminating in the Roman Empire. Can we discover any evil in the process of that complex political aggregation which may have conduced to its doom? I venture to detect a too narrow, and therefore false, insistence on the idea of Race. That idea was embodied by Statesmen and sung by poets almost exclusively in respect of the *Gens*

*Romana*, of the descendants, that is, of some few among many Aryan tribes. I pass over the possibly consequent exaggeration of patrician sentiment in the City of Rome and of her immediate territories, though this, accidentally, subjected the whole civilized world to a political war originating in the party politics of that one city. The greater evil was that the legitimate pride of other races within the Empire was unduly starved. Virgil, singing of Æneas but also applauding the Empire of Augustus, wrote in the tag we all know :—

“Tantæ molis erat Romanam condere gentem.”

And, in a hundred years, we have Plutarch and Philo, in two hundred years, Diogenes and Lucian dwelling not on the idea of Race nor even on the idea of Empire, but on cosmopolitanism. And, what an obvious political fiction was the Roman citizenship of St. Paul !

The insistence on a too narrow, and therefore false, interpretation of the Race ideal made for cosmopolitanism. It destroyed local colour and feature throughout the vast extension of the Empire. And this baneful tendency towards cosmopolitanism was, in the absence of adequate local attachment, still further fostered by the marked development in facilities for transit. The multiplication and cheapening of transit, leading to the interchange of commodities and the assimilation of traditional characteristics, makes for wealth and convenience and, perhaps, though more doubtfully, for toleration. It bestows on mankind many boons of great value. Yet, tradition, too, has her legacy, also of great value. If the convenience and wealth afforded by transit bulk too largely in the esteem of individual men, they are apt to lose the virility of citizenship and to become politically vapid citizens of the world.

The Roman Empire subsided into a drab level of political uniformity, comfortable for individuals, but conducive to civic apathy and decay. Roman statesmen and poets were unaware of that decay until the advent of barbarian in-roads. Indeed, to judge from the latest Latin authors, they were so drugged by a narrow Race idealism, so enervated by the laxity of cosmopolitanism, as to be insensible of the catastrophe to their Empire until some years after its foundations had, in fact, been shaken to their base.

Taking the second epoch of history from the time when these barbarians, our ancestors, pierced into Europe and into the British Isles, we see the idea of Race predominating for centuries over the development of the State. Not only in Scotland, but throughout these Isles, throughout France and Germany, Italy and Spain, we have to deal with true races,

that is to say with clans. And these comparatively small human polities were influenced almost wholly by the conservative force of tradition at a time when transit, the levelling force, was precarious.

Later, and by degrees, the idea of fixed abode emerges, and you get the country, or *pays*, in the earlier and narrower sense of those terms which I have sought to define. So that you have a Europe of innumerable races pegged down upon innumerable plots: hence feudalism.

But the third feature, or force, found in every stage of the State's Development, namely, Political Gravitation, begins to work. The papacy becomes, in Hobbes' fine phrase, "the ghost of the Roman Empire sitting on the grave thereof." As against that ghostly shadow of an Imperial State, Charlemagne, and many another, planned the construction of a solid

Empire. Their designs are reflected, here and there, in the dreams of Arthurian legend. These two ideals, for all that the first was a fantasy and the second a failure, were in themselves constructive. They precipitated the conflict between the Empire and the Papacy. But neither of them prevailed. Nor were subsequent attempts at further developments of the State attended, during the Middle Age, with any lasting success.

The idea of race embodied in countless clans was continuously stiffened as each clan, ceasing to wander, became tied hard and fast to a provincial area in obedience to the idea of fixed abode, so that a multiplex conjunction of the two ideas produced, in the chequer-board of a materialized feudalism, a medium too refractory for the realization of Empire. The glory of Feudalism was in the Crusades ; its failure, in abortive attempts at Empire ; its disgrace in the 100 years' war. For in that

war, and in others of like origin, the feudal overlord, actuated by dynastic pride, betrayed even the idea of Race without accomplishing a further stage in the Development of the State. Feudalism, exhausted by abortive political construction, and dishonoured by treachery to its traditional inspiration, proved too intractable to the force of Political Gravitation.

In the first epoch, a narrow interpretation of the Race idea exclusively in respect of one race destroyed the traditions of other races and so weakened the idea of local attachment. Free play was given to Political Gravitation over a featureless expanse, but only to produce the personal comfort and political languor of cosmopolitanism. In the second epoch, the constructive results of Political Gravitation were never attained. The wide diffusion of Races, sporadically entrenched in a medley of fiefs, presented obstacles on which that force ex-



pended its main momentum and, for the rest, was deflected towards dynastic ideals unrelated to any true development of the State. It was then at the opening of the third epoch of history that statesmen deliberately fabricated out of the ruins of Feudalism, the modern Nation-States of the last three or four hundred years.

And now, after those years, the fabricated Nation-States, not wholly homogeneous even within their European frontiers, are, in some cases, notably in our own, exposed to the strain of vast over-sea dependencies. They are called to take up once more the arduous enterprise of initiating a further stage in the Development of the State, by devising yet another and larger and more complex type of polity. What will that type be? To that question there is, as yet, no final answer. We can only say that it will *not* be, unless we consider and shun known errors. Can we

harmonize the idea of race with the idea of attachment to a fixed abode and then apply the stress of Political Gravitation to these resultant harmonies so equably as to avoid a fatal violence to either idea?

At the beginning of the epoch of Nation-States no single race was co-extensive with a nation. Now, in the last decades of that epoch, in but few instances does any one nation occupy all the territory of a State. We must count on the persistent force of Political Gravitation. We must consider the successive expansions of meaning in the words *natio*, *nation*, *nationalism*, and reflect that what we now call a "nation" may not exhaust the possible developments of that word's meanings. But what do we now call a nation? Of all political terms that is, perhaps, the most equivocal. The Poles are a nation. They speak one language and, broadly, are of one race. But

they are citizens of three separate States. The Swiss are a nation. They are the citizens of one State, but they speak at least three languages, French, German, and Italian; they are descended from three Aryan stocks, and probably, if we accept the most recent conclusions of Ethnology, also, and in a large degree, from a widely alien non-Aryan broad-headed race which Professor Ripley calls Alpine, and detects by head-measurements in other mountainous regions of Western Europe. Yet political writers who deplore the partition of Poland because of the Poles' identity of race and language acclaim the nationality of the Swiss despite of diversity in their speech and origin. Mr. Herbert Paul, in a luminous "introductory memoir" prefixed to the *Letters of Lord Acton to Mary Gladstone*, gives Lord Acton's view of Nationalism. 'By "Nationalism" Lord Acton meant, as he explains, "the complete and consistent

theory that the State and the nation must be co-extensive.” Assent and dissent are alike impertinent in the absence of agreement on the meaning of the word “nation.” The just use of that word seems a matter rather of feeling than of thought. The French, thanks to the exertions of Kings and Statesmen, have for centuries been a nation, though the Franks were but one Teutonic clan. Italy, partly through the influence of political writers, has recently become a State co-extensive with a nation. On the other hand, the United Kingdom is not co-extensive with our State, and no one nation is co-extensive even with the limits of the United Kingdom. You, the Scots, are a nation: the United Kingdom includes but a fraction of the State’s territory. With such a choice before us we cannot accept the static resultant of Political Gravitation in a particular place and at a particular time as a permanent index to political truth. Political

Gravitation is dynamic. The Western State, once embodied in a wandering tribe, or a Greek city, has developed under the stress of that force into, say, the German Empire or the United States of America. We could, of course, use the word nation as a synonym for the citizens of any State at any stage of development. But, then, it would cease to suggest what most people mean when they speak of Nationality. Let us, by all means, revere Nationality; but Nationality conscious of Race diversity in its origin and aspiring towards a yet more comprehensive ideal but imperfectly realized in the Empire as it is. The sentiment of Nationality, however lofty, has, in common with every human sentiment, the defects of its qualities. It may harden into Nationalism and oppose obstacles to the further Development of the State. Yet it is not, on that account, to be lightly rejected. Any nation,

and therefore every nation within the State, needs character, if only to redeem the State from a featureless cosmopolitanism. Character implies legitimate pride. Pride can only be based on the past, and pride in the past is a political virtue.

I would, however, advance a view which is not, I believe, paradoxical, though possibly it may court challenge. It is that, for the purpose of assisting the development of the State, pride of Race, provided the facts of Race be studied and understood, is a better, and a sounder, incentive than pride of Nationality. Pride of Race is a better incentive, because it refers back to a remoter and so, for the purposes of pride, more honourable past. It is a sounder incentive because it refers with closer accuracy to the earlier and more spontaneous Developments of the State. Nationality, however venerable in itself, seems, by comparison with our long descent from many Aryan

clans, a political device of relatively recent invention. We are nearer to the truth, though farther from the present, if, putting Nationality with all due observance and regard in the second place, we found our political self-esteem chiefly on lineage from one or more of those flashing waves of Aryan onset which reached our shores in succession during many centuries.

When the absorbing problems of Race shall have received the profound study which they demand from adepts in the old humanistic arts of History and Literature, and in the new humanistic sciences of Ethnology and Folklore, pride of Race will become an effective and a healthy political incentive. It will weaken temptation towards social strife within the State. It will check arrogance, born as ever of ignorance, in the attitude of one nation towards another descended also from Aryan ancestors. It will help us to respect non-Aryan Races more



ancient than our own, albeit that centuries may have elapsed since they swayed the fortunes or defended the frontiers of any political State. It may assist us to understand the Jews who have endured ages of oppression, and can afford to ignore them when they recall David and the Macchabees, or remember that their ancestors read and wrote immortal books, built palaces and temples, the while our ancestors wandered unkempt over snow-clad fells or threaded the tangles of the Hercynian forest.

Nationalism, Chauvinism, Jingoism, in short, by whatever name you call it, the hubristic excess of political virtue, is not, I would argue, justly chargeable to pride of Race. The idea of Race does not inject, as it were, a venom of arrogance into the sane body of Nationality. It is rather the false, unhistorical view of Nationality as co-extensive with one Race which gives a dangerous momentum to a political sentiment



otherwise exalted and useful in the Development of the State. Let pride be in Race, patriotism for the Empire.

The several races or strains in a nation enrich it, as they are held to enrich the nature of a man. Fortunately we, whether we be Scots, or English, or Irish, or Welsh, can lay claim to many such strains ; perhaps to more than we suspect or readily acknowledge. Yet, if we are to assist at the birth of an organic Empire-State, we must beware of excessive pride even in Race. We may proudly vaunt our lineage. Each man amongst us may claim to represent not one only—that is almost always a mistake—but two, or more, of the high-born and valorous Aryan clans. But too great a pride, however well founded on Aryan descent, may unfit us for playing our part in constructing a State that must embrace many non-Aryan races. Is it certain that our pride in exclusive

Aryan descent is wholly well-founded? We cannot be quite sure until the infant sciences of Ethnology and Folk-lore have come to maturity. For the time being we may reflect that the Highland chieftain with a pedigree reaching back to the Ark, the Norman noble, the heir of Milesian tannists, the scion of Welsh princes may each be forced, by the future advance of these sciences, to admit in his veins some drops of non-Aryan blood. They may have to trace their descent, in some degree, also to neolithic man who, during aeons before their ancestors reached these isles, patiently exterminated the really large and dangerous species of wild beasts, leaving to our high-born progenitors only such small deer as may minister to the pleasure of the chase. That may, or may not, prove true. But in respect of many inhabitants of these islands it is antecedently probable.

When these islands were successively cut off from the Continent by a sequence of geological depressions they were inhabited, and not sparsely, by men whose stone implements litter our fields and fill our museums. Did your Irish ancestors, the Scots, who founded, here, the kingdom of Dalriada, and so gave to our Sovereign the remotest among his many fountains of Regal origin, really kill all the men, and, what is more to the point, all the women who were Picts and spoke their non-Aryan language? I know that only five words of the Pictish tongue remain. In an examination which allowed to candidates a free choice from all languages I should select the Pictish language. It can be mastered in one minute. But of all guides to ethnology language is not the least fallacious. Languages, like the cut of coats and trowsers, have been assumed during all ages in order, not to earn a living wage, but to live. Languages, historically

and pre-historically, have been costumes. And costumes cease to be customs when, like habits, they are contracted from other people. Customs yield a surer guide to race problems. Five words only remain of the Pictish language, but you, the Scots, reveal in your folk-lore rudiments of customs that are certainly pre-historic, and, as some hold, non-Aryan. Were the Picts exterminated? Did not any Aryan invader at any time marry a woman from the races whom he and his clansmen overthrew? Many invasions of these islands are recorded in history. Others are, I believe, truthfully adumbrated in legend. From history and legend we gather, and common-sense confirms, that these invasions were prosecuted by picked warriors in a few boats, no one of which was large. The invaders drove up the aborigines into hills and caves and came to regard them as unhuman, as gnomes

or fairies. But then, are those tales pure inventions which tell of Celtic chieftains marrying fairy queens and princesses from the people who dwelt in mounds? Legend refracts and distorts, but it rarely invents. That which we know to have taken place in historic times when an Osterling or a Norman married a high-born Celtic maiden, may have taken place in pre-historic times.

However that may be, the present inhabitants of these islands are certainly descended from many Aryan clans, and possibly descended from yet earlier invaders. It should not, therefore, be hard for us to avoid the danger of undue insistence on a narrow interpretation of the Race idea. We know that many a Race has been driven up into our mountains, there to preserve traditions from earlier ages as an Arctic flora is preserved at high altitudes above the sea. We know that many a race has

reached our shores from those who, in pre-historic eras, brought bronze and iron, down to the Huguenots, who brought the art of higher manufacture. But these islands were the uttermost parts of the old world. Here the westward rambling, whether of conquered or conquering tribes, was stayed at the brink of the Atlantic. And the fittest have survived; whether by moderation after victory, or by fortitude after defeat. Within these islands political virtue has been accumulated from the Stone Age onwards. Our political nature, called insular, has never been isolated. It has been enriched again and again, as the flora of islands is diversified by bird-borne seeds. We are of the highlands and islands, claiming the longest tradition from the peaks of antiquity; the most varied fertilization from ocean transit.

## V

IN order to direct the further Development of the State by the light of the past we must frankly accept features persistently exhibited in every preceding type of the State. But we must avoid undue emphasis on any one of them. It would be inexcusable to mis-read the lessons of the most recent epoch. Nationality, the characteristic of the third epoch of Western history, may, if its sentiment be exaggerated, expose the State to danger, either of internal disruption, or of arrogance in external relations. Let us revere Nationality ; let us also recall that all Races, and some Empires, can boast a longer existence than Nation-States.



The remedy against exaggeration of National sentiment lies in preferring—I would not put it higher—the two ideas, of Empire and of Race.

But preference even so discreet will not justify complacency. If we insist unduly on the idea of Race, we shall relapse into that error which wrecked constructive efforts in the second epoch of history. A too intensive culture of Race tradition may frustrate yet again the trend of political gravitation. On the other hand, if we foster the idea of Empire at the cost of Race tradition, we shall sink once more into cosmopolitanism and court a recurrence of that catastrophe which concluded the first epoch.

I cannot say which of these two excesses may spell the greater danger to the Development of the State. We need, for the State that is to be, both the intension of Race and



the extension of Empire. Perhaps, at a time when facilities of transit are being multiplied and cheapened until they fascinate our imagination and seem to speak with the very voice of the Spirit of the Age, it is of cosmopolitanism that we should most be ware. The Spirit of the Age is seldom prophetic. A life of polyglot restaurants and international sleeping-cars does not conduce to civic virtue. It laps us in the listlessness of cosmopolitan luxury. It makes for satiety and slumber; and slumber, if unduly prolonged, invites a rude awakening. Here you can help; you of our ancient University. In an age pre-eminently of Transit there is greater need for Tradition. The tendency towards cosmopolitanism is enforced by the multiplication of facilities for Transit. Do not reinforce that tendency. Listen to the Spirit of the Age, but remember the Ages. Yield not an inch to popular

clamour which would restrict a University curriculum to applied science and modern languages. Do not abandon the heaped treasure of Humanistic learning.

We need the influence of facile Transit ; we need the aids of applied science and modern languages, but we need also the influence of Tradition. And that is to be found in the Literature and Legend of all ages, not in languages and appliances of one time. It must be sought in the Classics, in Archaeology, in comparative Mythology, in Ethnology, and in Folk-lore, for which Scotland offers a teeming field. These unravel the heart and mind of man. They declare how much of Piety towards all the Past is needed for Faith in any Future. Can we have that Faith ? I say, Yes, if the idea of Race emerging from the crucible of humanistic study shall cease to be a venom in the Nation ; if the Nation, understanding

its Race complexity, shall conform to ordered co-existence with other Nations similarly composed ; if the Empire, cherishing the legitimate pride of ancient Race, and but humouring the pretension of modern Nationality, be absolved from internal antagonism and safeguarded from cosmopolitan decay.

The perfected Empire-State of the Future, to evoke universal allegiance, must appeal to particular sentiment. Throughout its territories the influence of facilitated Transit must provide ever more abundantly all that is useful in the Present ; but the influence of cultivated Tradition must also preserve all that is hallowed from the Past.

If that can be compassed ; if full and equal play shall be given to Transit and to Tradition, to the horizontal and the vertical forces, whose interaction co-ordinates the progress of mankind, then to every citizen, wheresoever born and from

whomsoever descended, the "State" will in deed and in truth become that which, for lack of another name and for love of time-honoured glories, our posterity may still call the British Empire.



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